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From Rob Vesse <>
Subject Re: [VOTE] Accept Milagro into the Incubator
Date Tue, 15 Dec 2015 09:27:36 GMT
+1 (binding)

Good luck


On 15/12/2015 08:56, "Nick Kew" <> wrote:

>I should like to call a vote to accept Milagro into
>the Incubator.  The full proposal is available at
>as well as below.
>Note that the project was first discussed here under
>the name OpenMiracl.  The adoption of the Milagro name
>is a response to that discussion.
>[ ] +1 Accept Milagro into the Apache Incubator
>[ ] 0
>[ ] -1 Do not accept Milagro into the Apache Incubator ...
>The vote remains open until at least the end of the week.
>For myself:
>[*] +1 Accept Milagro into the Apache Incubator
>= Project Proposal: Milagro =
>== Abstract ==
>Milagro is a distributed cryptosystem for cloud computing. Its purpose
>is to provide an open source alternative to proprietary key management
>and certificate backed cryptosystems used for secure communication and
>authentication. The adoption of Milagro will create a secure, free, open
>source alternative to monolithic certificate authorities and eliminate
>single points of failure.
>== Background ==
>The Cloud Computing industry is using 40-year-old cryptographic
>algorithms and infrastructure, invented for a different era when
>client-server computing was the dominant paradigm. At the heart of it,
>is the continued reliance on outdated, and problematic, monolithic
>cryptographic trust hierarchies such as commercial certificate
>A number of factors are aligning to make this the right time to bring
>forth an alternative to the Internet's continued reliance on PKI.
>The Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) industry as a whole
>encounters friction bringing the largest customers in regulated
>industries onto their platforms because issues of cryptographic trust,
>data residency, and data governance prevent total adoption among
>regulated industries.
>Devops teams tasked with running an IaaS provider's datacenter
>automation encounter challenges scaling and automating data center
>operations when confronted with the complexities of running encryption,
>certificate and key management infrastructures built for a client-server
>Enterprises in regulated industries find challenges to transform
>entirely into digital businesses because the economics of cloud
>computing are unavailable to them.
>Despite the astounding growth of cloud infrastructure as a service
>platforms over the last few years, full adoption by organizations with
>stringent data security requirements won’t be achieved until these
>fundamental capability issues get resolved.
>Lastly, the Internet as a whole is suffering from an erosion of trust
>following incidents with commercial certificate authorities industry,
>i.e., compromised root keys, and failures in due diligence issuing real
>domain certificates.
>Indeed, mass surveillance, a lack of easy end-user encryption, a growing
>demand for key escrow under legal oversight, and general certificate
>authority security concerns create the question: How appropriate is the
>continued dependency on PKI when the goal is to advance the benefits of
>cloud computing across the technology landscape?
>Netcraft is the industry standard for monitoring Active TLS
>certificates. In May 2015, they stated that “Although the global [TLS]
>ecosystem is competitive, it is dominated by a handful of major CAs —
>three certificate authorities (Symantec, Comodo, Godaddy) account for
>three-quarters of all issued [TLS] certificates on public-facing web
>The Internet Security Research Group's (ISRG) "Let's Encrypt" initiative
>aims to make Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)
>certificates available for free in an automated fashion. This a step in
>the right direction, in that it removes the risk of profit before
>ethics. The real issue, which is one entity acts as a monolithic trust
>hierarchy, is not addressed. The monolithic trust hierarchy is a
>fundamental design flaw within PKI itself.
>The rate of attacks against certificate authorities seems to be
>[increasing]( as the obvious single
>point of compromise design inherent to PKI is becoming a more popular
>route to carry out attacks.
>== Proposal ==
>Milagro is an open source, pairing-based cryptographic platform to solve
>key management, secure communications, data governance and compliance
>issues that are challenging Cloud Providers and their customers.
>It does this without the need for certificate authorities, putting into
>place a new category of service providers called Distributed Trust
>Authorities (D-TA's).
>The M-Pin protocol, and its existing open-source MIRACL implementation
>on which Milagro will build, are already in use by Experian, NTT, Odin,
>Gov.UK and are being rolled out at scale for zero password multi-factor
>authentication and certificate-less HTTPS / secure channel.
>It is proposed that Milagro enter incubation at Apache.  At the same
>time, a draft standard for M-Pin has been prepared and recently
>submitted to IETF.  The standards process at IETF and the platform
>implementation at Apache will run in parallel.
>=== Why Pairing-Based Cryptography, why now? ===
>Over the last decade, pairings on elliptic curves have been a very
>active area of research in cryptography. Pairings map pairs of points on
>an elliptic curve into the multiplicative group of a finite field. Their
>unique properties have enabled many new cryptographic protocols that had
>not previously been feasible.
>Standards bodies have already begun standardizing various pairing-based
>schemes. These include the IEEE, ISO, and IETF. Besides identity-based
>encryption (IBE), the standardized schemes include identity-based
>signatures, identity-based signcryption, identity-based key
>establishment mechanisms, and identity-based key distribution for use in
>NIST has also recommended the standardization and adoption of
>pairing-based cryptographic systems __for government agencies__. In the
>NIST "Report on Pairing-based Cryptography" issued in February 2015,
>they state:
>>"It has been a decade since the first IBE schemes were proposed. These
>schemes have received sufficient attention from the cryptographic
>community and no weakness has been identified. IBE is being used
>commercially, primarily by Voltage Security and Trend Micro. Intel’s
>EPID scheme is another example of pairings being used commercially. > As
>a result of our study, we believe there is a good case for allowing
>government agencies to use pairings. Pairings have been shown to have
>numerous applications, helping to solve problems that are impossible,
>difficult, or inefficient with traditional public-key cryptography or
>symmetric encryption."
>The biggest beneficiary of these new pairing-based cryptographic
>protocols will be the Cloud Infrastructure as a Service industry.
>Pairing-based cryptography can provide real world solutions, right now,
>to the outstanding issues of cryptographic trust, data security,
>governance and compliance that create roadblocks to adoption of the
>Cloud by the industries that can most benefit from it.
>Pairing cryptography also makes possible the world in which a fleet of
>geographically distributed and organizationally independent Distributed
>Trust Authorities act as multiple private-key generators (PKGs) where
>trust need not reside in a single entity.
>The difference between this new world of Distributed Trust Authorities
>and the current PKI system will be a landscape that provides secure
>ease-of-use encryption and authentication, does not rely upon a single
>trusted third party, and yet allows for limited key escrow subject to an
>end customer's requirement.
>=== Milagro ===
>The Milagro libraries and tools consist of:
> * Distributed Key Management Service API
> * Distributed Key Management CLI
> * Software Defined Distributed Security Module (SD-DSM) build platform
> * Distributed Key Management Endpoints (software)
> * Crypto Apps, consisting of:
>  * M-Pin Authentication Platform (delivering password-less 2FA)
>   * M-Pin Secure Channel (delivering certificate-less TLS-PSK)
>   * M-Pin-in-Mobile Client Libraries for iOS, Android and Windows Phone
>   * M-Pin-in-Javascript Libraries for Browsers
>  * Cloud Encryption Gateway (under nascent development)
>  * Distributed Trust Authority Crypto App
>  * Generic library for IoT cryptographic library
>The startingpoint for these is the existing MIRACL library and tools at
>=== Distributed Trust Authorities ===
>The Milagro project introduces a service concept called a Distributed
>Trust Authority, to replace either single-authority certificates or
>public key infrastructure.
>The D-TA splits the functions of a pairing-based key generation server
>into three services issuing thirds of private keys to distinct
>identities. The shares of the private keys, received by Crypto App
>clients or Distributed Key Management Endpoints, become the only
>entities that possess any knowledge of the whole key created from the
>To effect anything resembling a root key compromise that can occur in a
>traditional PKI or commercial certificate authority, ***ALL***
>Distributed Trust Authority servers must be compromised.
>Cryptographically, one compromise of a Distributed Trust Authority does
>not yield an attacker any advantage, all Distributed Trust Authority
>master secrets inside each D-TA providing shares must be compromised.
>Note that all 3 D-TA's operate independently and are under separate
>organizational control.
>For the following examples, envision a Distributed Trust Authority model
>consisting of Cloud Provider (D-TA 1), Cloud Provider end customer (D-TA
>2) and neutral third party (D-TA 3).
>Under this three participant model, where each member is responsible for
>the security of their D-TA, the Cloud Provider can not subvert the
>security of the end customer, even with the collusion of the neutral
>third party. The end customer will not suffer an internal insider attack
>unless the Cloud Provider and neutral third party also collude.
>=== Distributed Key Management API, CLI, Endpoints ===
>The core infrastructure that consumes these thirds of private keys and
>is responsible for their distribution is a message bus and API (D-KMS
>API), a command line interface (CLI) and software (D-KMS Endpoints)
>which builds the Crypto Applications from source.
>Any entity can run any mix or combination of components with other
>entities, but there is no restriction on configuration. One party may
>operate all three D-TAs, Endpoints and APIs if they wish.
>The D-KMS CLI communicates securely with the API. The API is responsible
>for either creating cryptographic keys and secrets or protecting
>existing keys and secrets through cryptographic encapsulation, via a
>choice of pairing-based protocols. In either case, the API encapsulates
>the keys and secrets for the identity of particular D-KMS Endpoints.
>The D-KMS Endpoints are server operating systems with D-KMS Endpoint
>software installed. The D-KMS Endpoint software, in conjunction with the
>D-KMS CLI, has the appropriate pairing-based cryptographic keys to be
>able to de-encapsulate secrets and keys received from the D-KMS API.
>These de-encapsulated secrets and keys can be stored, distributed or
>used in Crypto Applications, such as M-Pin Authentication, Secure
>Channel or Encryption Gateway.
>=== SD-DSM / Crypto Applications ===
>Software Defined Distributed Security Modules, otherwise known as Crypto
>Applications "Crypto Apps" get compiled from source files on-demand.
>Crypto App source files will be hosted on major public repositories such
>as Github and Apache.
>Crypto Applications are scaled across the datacenter through the D-KMS
>API in conjunction with orchestration tools such as Apache Mesos and
>consume the de-encapsulated secrets and keys.
>==== M-Pin Authentication and Secure Channel ====
>M-Pin is already deployed by such organizations as NTT and Experian in a
>two node Distributed Trust Authority model, where MIRACL and its
>customer each host a D-TA node. In Experian's case, M-Pin was selected
>to provide authentication for Experian's identity assurance platform,
>contracted to the UK Government, for secure authentication of online
>citizens into UK government websites, including HMRC (tax office). M-Pin
>was selected based on its security efficacy and ability to scale to an
>Internet scale user population (UK online citizenry).
>The M-Pin Authentication Platform serves as an example of what is
>possible exploiting a pairing based protocol. M-Pin is capable of
>running in a native browser mode, delivering two-factor authentication.
>M-Pin binds to any identity (as long as it is worldly unique) and
>improves the user authentication experience as it can be visualized in a
>familiar ATM-style pin pad.
>It's most unique trait is the exploitation of zero knowledge proof
>authentication. The M-Pin Client proves to the M-Pin Server it possesses
>its cryptographic authentication key without revealing it to the server.
>As a result, the M-Pin Server stores no authentication credentials,
>eliminating the possibility of credential (i.e., password) smash n' grab
>M-Pin Secure Channel extends the protocol to include authenticated key
>agreement between server and client and mutual client-server
>authentication. The 'agreed key' is unique for each session, possessing
>perfect forward secrecy.
>M-Pin Secure Channel takes the agreed key and injects the key into a
>TLS-PSK session between client and server, providing mutual
>authentication and perfect forward secrecy without the need for PKI.
>This cryptographic underpinning can be extended to create secure VPN
>sessions over various protocols.
>In an M-Pin client and server context, clients and servers receive their
>shares of their private keys from all three Distributed Trust
>Authorities. In the previously mentioned example, this could be Cloud
>Provider, end customer and neutral third party or any combination
>M-Pin Client and Server code are already open source, having been
>previously released under BSD-Clause-3.
>The next iteration and revision will be licensed under the Apache
>==== Cloud Encryption Gateway ====
>Many proprietary solutions have appeared on the information security
>market to solve data governance issues about securing data in the cloud
>with encryption keys managed by an end customer. To date, most of these
>solutions involve purchasing hardware or virtualized appliances to run
>in an end customer's datacenter, with nothing more delivered than a
>single encryption key under control of the end customer, performing
>sub-optimum deterministic encryption on data sent to the cloud.
>The Milagro Cloud Encryption Gateway will be a virtualized or container
>based software, deployed in an end customer's environment. This CEG will
>exploit pairing-based capabilities such as attribute-based encryption
>(anyone in possession of the correct set of attributes can decrypt) and,
>more generally, predicate-based encryption (anyone in possession of the
>right set of attributes and a decryption key corresponding to a
>particular predicate can decrypt).
>Doing so increases the flexibility of the solution by being enabled to
>address data residency and governance requirements such as geo-location
>while allowing key management and rotation protocols to be enforced.
>== Rationale ==
>The benefits of a strong authentication, secure channel and cloud
>encryption via an identity framework for people and things are
>self-evident, and the plethora of homebrew proprietary solutions and
>password nightmares seen today is clear evidence of a need for better
>Milagro's distributed trust model is particularly attractive, by virtue
>of dispensing with need for (and potential for abuse of) any central
>trust authority without requiring sophistication - such as understanding
>a Web of Trust - from end users.
>A move to incubation at Apache will help the community to grow and take
>on new members in an environment that guarantees open development and
>protection of participants.
>This is particularly relevant right now as a second corporate team, NTT
>Data, with its own culture joins as core developers. For the outside
>world, it offers the strong promise of openness.
>== Initial Goals ==
>Milagro will seek to integrate the existing projects at Certivox (now
>MIRACL) and NTT, and will invite participation from a nascent broader
>community evidenced by the core MIRACL library's 65 watchers and 29
>forks at Github.
>As well as looking to broaden direct participation, it will seek
>synergies with relevant Apache projects, for example by providing
>Milagro plugins for HTTPD and Trafficserver.
>The initial software products will be the current standing M-Pin Core
>platform, client libraries and the SD-DSM and Distributed Key Management
>API and client CLI (as noted above).
>== Current Status ==
>Certivox (now MIRACL) has developed open source software at Github since
>2014, though the core MIRACL library goes back much further. Projects
>currently at Github include the M-Pin Authentication Platform and the
>MIRACL cryptographic libraries under BSD-Clause-3 and AGPL licenses.
>These have attracted both community and corporate interest taking them
>beyond the realm of a single-company project, with NTT being the second
>corporate team to take a substantial part in development.  The project
>now seeks to transition smoothly to a full Open Development model.
>The core team at Certivox (now MIRACL) is geographically dispersed and
>developers are well-accustomed to using online infrastructure and tools
>for their everyday work.  The team at NTTi3 and NTT DATA and other
>contributing developers are included amongst the initial committers.
>In addition to MIRACL operating a community D-TA, NTT, Experian and
>Dimension Data have all agreed to host no-charge community D-TAs.  Other
>cloud providers are considering and have been engaged. An open source
>platform from which to offer these services is a necessary component to
>finalizing and launching community D-TA's.
>== Meritocracy and Community ==
>The project is moving from a single (startup) company open source
>project seeking a wider community, to embrace a second corporate
>development team and third-party developers.  The project is committed
>to broadening the community through meritocracy, and expects to welcome
>contributions and recognize contributors.
>It is hoped that incubation at Apache will help with this broadening, by
>providing a widely-recognised and well-understood framework for working
>collaboratively, growing communities, and protecting contributors.
>== Core Developers ==
>Dr. Michael Scott, Chief Cryptographer at Certivox (now MIRACL), has
>been a major open source and standards contributor to the field of
>elliptic curve cryptography for over twenty-five years.
>Others include
>=== Existing team at Certivox/MIRACL: ===
> . Patrick Hilt - CTO
> . Kealan Mccusker - Cryptographer
> . Stanislav Mihaylov - Architect
> . Simeon Aladhem - Developer
>=== Existing team at NTT: ===
> . Go Yamamoto - Cryptographer
> . Kenji Takahishi - Developer
>=== Existing ASF Member: ===
> . Nick Kew - Developer
>== Alignment: ==
>Whereas Milagro has no track record of its own, the Certivox (now
>MIRACL) team have been working on related projects at Github.  Being
>geographically diverse, the team is well-accustomed to day-to-day
>working in a similar environment to Apache and with similar tools and
>processes. The anticipated role of Apache is to help the community to
>grow without fragmentation of communities, code, or intellectual
>We are not aware of any link with existing Apache projects.  However, it
>is likely that several Apache projects may be interested in working with
>Milagro to provide distributed identity services.  Plugins for HTTPD and
>Trafficserver are already anticipated.
>== Known Risks ==
>=== Orphaned products ===
>Milagro, as successor to the existing MIRACL and M-Pin software at
>github, is at the core of Certivox (now MIRACL)'s business and important
>to NTT, Experian, and other platform adopters who are in the process of
>coming online.
>Interest, and with it both developer and user communities, are expected
>to grow strongly.  There is little risk of the project losing momentum
>in the foreseeable future.
>=== Experience with Open Source ===
>The software has a history as open source, developed until recently by a
>geographically distributed team within a single company. Github activity
>shows some evidence of a wider community.  The major new development
>that leads the proposers to seek incubation at Apache is the coming of
>new corporate interest: while both corporate teams have open-source
>experience, their cultures and backgrounds differ.
>We hope that incubation at Apache may help the teams collaborate in an
>environment of mutual benefit, as well as attract independent developers
>to play a full part.
>=== Homogenous Developers. ===
>The established corporate teams are dispersed across several European
>countries and Japan.  Prospective developers (whose companies are
>interested in Milagro) are located in other countries, and we anticipate
>a global community.
>=== Reliance on Salaried Developers ===
>Most of the initial committers are salaried developers from the core
>corporate teams.  Github activity, including 29 forks of the Miracl
>library, indicates wider community interest, and it is hoped that the
>developer community will grow substantially at Apache.
>=== Apache Brand ===
>The Apache brand is of course seen as an advantage.  However, the
>project is more directly concerned with the Apache platform and
>environment to unite diverse teams.
>== Relationships with Other Apache Products ==
>See Alignment above.
>== Documentation ==
>Milagro derives from Certivox's existing M-Pin, MIRACL and associated
>tools at Documentation at
>may also inform and feed into the Milagro project.
>== Initial Source and Intellectual Property ==
>As soon as Milagro is accepted into the Incubator, Certivox (now MIRACL)
>will transfer the source code and trademark to the ASF with a Software
>Grant, and licensed under the Apache License 2.0. Certivox/MIRACL
>retains rights to its existing MIRACL mark.
>== External Dependencies ==
>There are no external dependencies and all software is under the sole
>ownership of Certivox/MIRACL.
>== Cryptography ==
>This is advanced cryptographic software, and as such may be subject to
>government interest and red tape in some countries. However, the
>architecture by which SD-DSM / Crypto Apps are distributed, via open
>source freely available code repositories, is intentional to exploit the
>near universal interpretation of the Wassenar agreement to permit export
>of open source cryptography without restriction (in most cases).
>== Required Resources ==
> * private
> * dev
> * users
>Git repository (to mirror existing github repo)
> *
>Issue Tracking
> * JIRA repository to be requested
>==== Trust Authority Service ====
>The podling would like to request a VM at
>"ta.milagro[.incubator]" with which to run a Community Trust
>Authority.  It is anticipated that this will serve as a test facility
>for developers and may become a Trust Authority for the community of ASF
>== Initial Committers ==
> * Akira Nagai             (NTT)
> * Brian Spector           (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Fuji Hitoshi            (NTT)
> * Genoveffa Pagano        (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Go Yamamoto             (NTT)
> * Jordan Katserov         (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Kealan Mccusker         (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Kenji Takahishi         (NTT)
> * Michael Scott           (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Milen Rangelove         (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Mitko Yugovski          (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Michael Scott           (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Nick Kew                (Apache)
> * Nick Pateman            (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Patrick Hilt            (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Simeon Aladhem          (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Stanislav Mihaylov      (Certivox/MIRACL)
> * Tetsutaro Kobayashi     (NTT)
>== Sponsors ==
>=== Champion ===
> . Nick Kew
>=== Mentors ===
> * Sterling Hughes
> * Jan Willem Janssen
> * Nick Kew
>=== Sponsoring Entity ===
> . The Apache Incubator
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